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1 Introduction 
Nowadays ICT systems often embed functionalities that are 
partially realized, controlled or monitored by distributed sub-
systems. Paradigms as Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), Cloud 
Systems and even Cluster Computing usually network together 
different components or subsystems to deliver such functionalities. 
To this extent, they often offer remote access to services and 
relevant information, and they may consequently be subject to 
(cyber)attacks [2], [6], [92], [95]. In the last decade, such cyber-
threats had a constantly growing impact as pointed out by several 
reports [7], [8]. Consequently, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) 
[3], [4] became critical building blocks to detect potential threats 
and trigger modules that are able to block or mitigate the adverse 
effects of cyber-threats. IDSs collect and analyse data from 
networks and - often - system indicators to potentially detect 
malicious or unauthorized activities, based on the hypothesis that an 
ongoing attack has distinguishable effects on such indicators.  
1.1 Signatures and Anomalies 
Network data and system indicators are used since decades as 
baseline to derive signatures of known attacks. For example, 
malformed headers in packets or emails, that may generate 
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A B S T R A C T 
In the last decades, researchers, practitioners and companies struggled in devising mechanisms to detect 
malicious activities originating security threats. Amongst the many solutions, network intrusion 
detection emerged as one of the most popular to analyze network traffic and detect ongoing intrusions 
based on rules or by means of Machine Learners (MLs), which process such traffic and learn a model to 
suspect intrusions. Supervised MLs are very effective in detecting known threats, but struggle in 
identifying zero-day attacks (unknown during learning phase), which instead can be detected through 
unsupervised MLs. Consequently, supervised and unsupervised MLs have their own advantages and 
downfalls that complement each other. Unfortunately, there are no definitive answers on the combined 
use of both approaches for network intrusion detection. In this paper we first expand the problem of 
zero-day attacks and motivate the need to combine supervised and unsupervised algorithms. We propose 
the adoption of meta-learning, in the form of a two-layer Stacker, to create a mixed approach that detects 
both known and unknown threats. Then we implement and empirically evaluate our Stacker through an 
experimental campaign that allows i) debating on meta-features crafted through unsupervised base-level 
learners, ii) electing the most promising supervised meta-level classifiers, and iii) benchmarking 
classification scores of the Stacker with respect to supervised and unsupervised classifiers. Last, we 
compare our solution with existing works from the recent literature. Overall, our Stacker reduces 
misclassifications with respect to (un)supervised ML algorithms in all the 7 public datasets we 
considered, and outperforms existing studies in 6 out of those 7 datasets. In particular, it turns out to be 
more effective in detecting zero-day attacks than supervised algorithms, limiting their main weakness 
but still maintaining adequate capabilities in detecting known attacks. 
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problems as resource exhaustion [9], can be detected by range-
checking fields of the packets that arrive from the network. 
Moreover, ransomwares can be effectively detected [10] by 
analysing system calls to check if they compute cryptographic 
functions. Signature-based approaches perform satisfactorily when 
aiming at known attacks [2], [3], [4]; on the other hand, they exhibit 
weaknesses in detecting variations of known attacks or zero-day 
attacks [6], whose signature is unknown. 
The alternative to signature-based intrusion detection is offered 
by anomaly-based [1] intrusion detection. Suspicious activities can 
be detected through Machine Learning (ML) algorithms that rely on 
past network and system observations to learn a model that 
classifies novel data points into either normal data points or 
anomalous data points i.e., potential attacks. Figure 1 shows how a 
(binary) classifier is first trained (Tr1, Tr2) to learn a model. 
Training is mainly performed using labels, which indicate if data 
points correspond to attacks or not. Then, the classifier predicts the 
label for a novel data point (Te1) by running a ML algorithm which 
outputs a numerical value (e.g., it may compute the distance to the 
centroid of the nearest cluster, Te2). This  value is sent to a decision 
function (e.g.: “is the data point sufficiently close to the centroid of 
the cluster, such that we can assume the data point belongs to the 
cluster? ”, Te3): the decision function outputs a binary label (Te4) 
which decides if the data point is anomalous or not. The decision 
function may be embedded into the classifier, or be a parameter of 
the classifier itself. In our clustering example, it may i) be a static 
threshold, ii) depend on the sparsity of the cluster, or iii) be related 
to the amount of items in the cluster, and so on.  
1.2 Supervised and Unsupervised Intrusion Detection 
Intrusion Detectors that rely on Supervised ML algorithms require 
historical system observations for which the label (also called class) 
is known. They learn a model to classify any new observation – 
data point – either as collected i) when a system is under malicious 
attack, or ii) during normal operations. For example, the literature 
reports on the successful usage of Random Forests [31], Support 
Vector Machines [33], Convolutional [34] and Deep [35], [38] 
Neural Networks for the detection of security threats through the 
analysis of network traffic. These supervised ML algorithms are 
very effective in detecting known threats, albeit they cannot 
effectively deal with novel or unknown threats. Unfortunately, this 
is a severe weakness as many threats cannot be identified at system 
design time. 
On the other hand, unsupervised ML algorithms do not assume 
any knowledge on the attacks. They model the expected (normal) 
behaviour of the system, and classify any deviation from the normal 
behaviour as anomaly, i.e., suspected attacks [1]. Clustering 
algorithms [65], [69] are probably the most widespread 
unsupervised ML algorithms, despite statistical [60], angle [46], 
density [70], [63] algorithms, and unsupervised variants of neural 
networks [64], neighbour-based [61], [71] or classification [72], 
[62] algorithms were proven to be valid alternatives [29], [30]. 
Since unsupervised ML algorithms build their model without 
relying on labels, they do not distinguish between known and 
unknown or zero-day attacks. However, they are more prone to 
misclassifications of known attacks than supervised algorithms. 
1.3 On the Complementarity and Combination of 
Supervised and Unsupervised Algorithms 
As evident from the above discussion, supervised and unsupervised 
approaches are complementary.  
Supervised techniques learn from past attack episodes, and 
mainly model the (known) malicious behaviours. In fact, the 
adoption of supervised classifiers always carries a deliberate 
weakness in detecting zero-day threats, or (slight) modifications of 
known attacks. While it is true that classifiers may employ 
techniques to prevent overfitting (e.g., pruning Decision Trees [5]) 
and therefore avoid building a model that corresponds too closely to 
a particular attack, there is no reliable way to make supervised 
classifiers suitable to detect previously unknown threats. Instead, 
unsupervised techniques model a normal behaviour and classify any 
deviation as anomaly.  
Each holds its own strengths and weaknesses, and as such they 
perform differently depending on the scenario; as a consequence, it 
is highly desirable to pair supervised classifiers with unsupervised 
classifiers as in [12], [13], [14], [17]. Indeed, most of these 
solutions are very problem-specific and may hardly be generalized. 
Additionally, combining both approaches is not trivial and does not 
always result in improved capabilities: some misleading algorithms 
may let the combination of both approaches lean towards a 
misclassification, with obvious detrimental effects. 
Potential strategies to tackle these challenges come from the 
Meta-Learning [74] domain. A Meta-Learner (or Meta-Classifier) 
orchestrates ensembles of MLs to improve classification 
capabilities. For example, well-known supervised classifiers as 
Random Forests [31] and ADABoost [32] respectively build 
homogeneous Bagging [21] and Boosting [22] ensembles of 
decision trees to compute the final result. Instead, Voting [36] is 
widely used by system architects to design and implement 
redundant systems [37]. Other approaches as Stacking [23], 
Cascading [24], Arbitrating [27] and Delegating [26] are less 
notorious but still deemed relevant [28]. 
1.4 Contribution and Paper Structure 
To the best of our knowledge, in the literature there is neither clear 
agreement nor experimental confirmation on the proper approach to 
orchestrate and combine supervised and unsupervised classifiers to 
detect network intrusions, despite several tries have been made 
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throughout years. Consequently, this paper first recaps on available 
strategies to combine classifiers for attack detection (Section 2) and 
on suitability of Meta-Learning in combining or merging both 
supervised and unsupervised classifiers (Section 3). Such discussion 
lets Section 4 proposing an approach based on Stacking with 
multiple unsupervised base-level learners and a supervised meta-
level learner to improve the detection of both known and unknown - 
zero-day - threats. 
Then, we plan, setup and execute in Section 5 an experimental 
campaign using public attack datasets and well-known 
unsupervised/supervised algorithms that aims to show the 
advantages of our Stacker over state-of-the-art algorithms. This 
allows Section 6 debating on how such base-learners provide 
additional and relevant meta-features [75], paving the way for 
discussing the classification performance of our approach with 
respect to supervised and unsupervised algorithms. It turns out that 
our Stacker classifies known attacks better than supervised 
algorithms while noticeably enhancing the detection of zero-day 
attacks. Then, Section 7 shows how to build a Stacker for a target 
system, letting Section 8 to compare results with other studies in the 
literature that report quantitative metrics on intrusion detection. 
Lastly, Section 9 concludes the paper and elaborates on future 
works.   
2 Previous works on combining Supervised and 
Unsupervised Classifiers for Intrusion Detection 
In [12], [79] authors combine an unsupervised (namely, clustering) 
strategy with a supervised classifier: clustering-dependent 
additional features are provided to the supervised classifier which 
ultimately decides on the classification. Their results are 
encouraging, despite they identify a key issue which they describe 
as “augmenting data sets with too many scores could be detrimental 
due to overfitting and variance issues” [12]. Briefly, their 
experimental data showed that adding knowledge derived by 
unsupervised tasks may constitute noise and disturbing – rather than 
helping – the supervised learning process. Similarly, in [15] authors 
processed the KDDCup99 dataset with a stacker that executes an 
unsupervised probabilistic model before than a supervised rule 
generator. They conclude that their approach helps discovering a 
general pattern that a specific group of outlier may have, despite 
results are valid only for the KDDCup99 dataset, now considered 
outdated, and analogous experiments were not repeated on recent 
datasets and attacks. 
Other researchers [14] aimed to “detect and isolate malicious 
flows from the network traffic and further classify them as a 
specific type of the known malwares, variations of the known 
malwares or as a completely new malware strain”. They first setup 
a binary classifier to distinguish between normal and anomalous 
data flows, while another supervised-unsupervised classifier 
isolates the specific malware classes. Malware is targeted also in 
[13], where authors define an hybrid malware detector that 
examines both the permissions and the traffic features to detect 
malicious activities in the Android OS. Similarly to [12], they first 
run the clustering procedure and subsequently build a k-Nearest 
Neighbour (kNN) classifier that performs better than a kNN that 
solely relies on dataset features. In [14] these layers are used to 
perform a multi-class identification of the detected malware, while 
clustering procedures are used in [13] and [14] to pre-filter data 
before applying supervised classification.  
It is worth noticing that mixed supervised-unsupervised learners 
are being proposed also in domains other than security. For 
example, they are proposed to support physics domain either to 
predict solar flares [18] or to improve performance of auto-encoders 
[19]. Most recently, they are proposed to help classification in 
healthcare [17] and to complement image processing [16]. Other 
studies independently execute heterogeneous classifiers in parallel 
to later combine their results into a unified score according to static 
rules e.g., voting [36], which was proven beneficial for redundant 
systems [37] and is currently applied in many domains. 
3 Meta-Learning to Combine Supervised and 
Unsupervised Classifiers 
Combining supervised and unsupervised classifiers usually implies 
building a multi-layer classification process where the result of each 
individual classifier contributes to the final output and may provide 
additional information to the other classifiers. 
3.1 Meta-Learning for Model Combination 
We first debate on strategies that are currently used to combine 
ensembles of heterogeneous and homogeneous classifiers. As 
defined in [74], a meta-learner is a classifier that uses knowledge 
acquired during base-learning episodes, i.e., meta-knowledge, to 
improve meta-level classification capabilities. More specifically, a 
base-learning process starts by feeding dataset features into one or 
more learning algorithms to derive one or more models to be used 
for classification at a base-level. Results of base-learners partially 
build meta-features [75] to be provided alongside with other 
features to the meta-level classifier, which computes the result of 
the whole meta-learner.  
Different meta-learners have been proposed through years, 
recently summarized in [28] and detailed as follows. 
 Bagging [21] combines base-learners of the same type by 
submitting bootstrap replicas of the training set. The unified 
result of the ensemble is derived by the majority of individual 
results of base-learners. 
 Boosting [22] builds an ensemble of homogeneous weak 
learners. Overall capabilities of a weak learner may not be 
excellent: the underlying idea of boosting is to orchestrate 
ensembles of weak learners to build a strong meta-learner. 
 Voting (Weighted) [36] counts opinions coming from an 
heterogeneous ensemble of individuals, and provide the final 
decision based on a linear aggregation (sum) of individual 
responses. Voters decide on a k out of N (kooN) rule as 
follows: when at least k out of N individuals (k ≤ N) agree on a 
result, the result is chosen as the result of the ensemble. 
 Stacking [23] relies upon different algorithms, trained with the 
exact same training set, as base-learners. Their outputs become 
model-based meta-features, which are fed to another 
independent classifier, the meta-level classifier, to deliver a 
unified result. Differently from bagging and boosting, the final 
output is not obtained through majority voting: the 
independent classifier combines individual results according to 
a general (and possibly non-linear) function.  
 Cascading [24] stems from boosting by employing 
heterogeneous weak learners to increase the system 
complexity. To derive the final result, the data point is 
sequentially sent through a sequence of classifiers. The first 
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classifier who is confident enough about its classification 
produces the output of the cascading meta-learner. 
 Delegating [26] is very similar to cascading, but all base-
learners are trained on the exact same portion of the train set. 
This meta-learner adopts a cautious approach: if a classifier is 
not confident enough about its result, the final decision is 
delegated to the next base-learner. 
 Cascade Generalization [25] performs a sequential 
composition of heterogeneous classifiers. Instead of a parallel 
use of classifiers as in Stacking, Cascade Generalization 
sequentially applies classifiers such that the (i+1)-th classifier 
is a meta-level learner for the i-th classifier. In other words, 
each classifier of the sequence is both a base-learner and a 
meta-learner. Similarly to Cascading, the first classifier who is 
confident enough produces the output of Cascade 
Generalization. 
3.2 Meta-Learning to Combine Supervised and 
Unsupervised Classifiers  
Meta-learners have been successfully used in the past to improve 
supervised classification [31], [32] or more recently for 
unsupervised learning [28]. However, their suitability for 
combining supervised and unsupervised classifiers is not 
straightforward and therefore has to be carefully analysed.  
Bagging and Boosting ensembles are homogeneous: therefore, 
they do not allow the simultaneous usage of supervised and 
unsupervised classifiers. Since the process of training weak learners 
in Boosting relies on identifying hard-to-classify areas of the 
training set (assuming train labels are known) we may think of 
using unsupervised weak base-learners to build Boosting. As 
described in [28], this solution outperforms most unsupervised 
classifiers, but still produces a lot more misclassifications with 
respect to supervised classifiers when dealing with known attacks. 
Cascading, Delegating and Cascade Generalization show 
potential as they embed heterogeneous base-level classifiers, but 
heavily rely on the concept of confidence of a classifier with respect 
to a specific class prediction. Suppose that an algorithm outputs 
probabilities for each of the two {normal, anomaly} classes and 
decides by choosing the class that reports on the highest probability: 
the higher the probability of belonging to the “majority class”, the 
higher the confidence. However, not all the algorithms clearly 
assign probabilities to classes. Moreover, confidence may depend 
on the decision function (see Figure 1, V3) used to convert numeric 
scores into binary labels, and the way it is calculated varies 
depending on implementations. Consequently, such confidence-
based meta-learners may suffer when there is no standardized way 
to calculate confidence, which will most likely be calculated 
differently when considering multiple supervised/unsupervised 
algorithms and decision functions (e.g., Interquartile Range, [57]).  
Stacking approaches may partially skip the problem of 
thresholding and confidence because they rely on model-based 
features as the numeric outputs of base-learners, which are then fed 
to the meta-level classifier [76], [83]. This is responsible of 
aggregating them and delivering a unified result, without 
calculating any confidence. Consequently, the choice of the meta-
level classifier has a relevant role in Stacking and therefore has to 
be planned carefully. 
 (Weighted) Voting deserves a separate discussion. Although it 
is widely used to manage redundant (and often diverse) components 
[37], [36], it cannot be easily adapted to vote on the individual 
decisions of both supervised and unsupervised classifiers. For 
example, we may consider three supervised algorithms S1, S2, S3 
and two unsupervised algorithms U1 and U2 that are run in parallel 
and their decisions aggregated by voting using a k out of 5 (koo5) 
rule. How do we set the k to define a koo5 rule without biasing the 
result towards either the supervised or the unsupervised algorithms? 
When zero-day attacks happen, supervised algorithms are likely to 
label a data point as “normal” while unsupervised algorithms U1 
and U2 have chances to detect the attack and label the data point as 
“anomalous”. Therefore, setting a threshold (e.g., k = 3) without 
considering who raised the alarm is not feasible. Moreover, 
weighted voting approaches may raise the amount of i) False 
Positives, if more weight is assigned to unsupervised algorithms, or 
ii) False Negatives, as zero day attacks are likely to be misclassified 
i.e., undetected, if heavier weight is given to supervised classifiers 
S1, S2 and S3.  
4 Supervised-Unsupervised Stacking 
Summarizing, Stacking turns out as the most promising meta-
learning technique for model combination that have the potential to 
combine supervised and unsupervised classifiers for Intrusion 
Detection. Therefore, this section details the main characteristics of 
Stacking and how we plan to instantiate a Stacker to combine 
Supervised and Unsupervised Intrusion Detectors. 
4.1 On the Choice of Base-Learners 
Stacking relies on different base-learners, which are classifiers built 
using the same dataset features and heterogeneous ML algorithms. 
Outputs of base learners produce model-based meta-features [75], 
which, alongside with dataset features, are fed to an independent 
meta-level classifier that delivers the final result. In addition, 
dataset features should be provided to the meta-learner alongside 
with model-based features, which describe the system. 
It is evident that the choice of meta-features, and consequently 
of the base-level classifiers to generate model-based features, plays 
a highly relevant role in defining base-learners for Stacking. The 
following combinations of supervised – unsupervised classifiers 
could be employed to define base-learners and to generate model-
based features. As motivated in Section 4.1.2, we consider the 
adoption of unsupervised base learners as the most beneficial 
approach out of potential alternatives. 
4.1.1 Supervised Base-Learners 
Supervised base-learners force the adoption of an unsupervised 
meta-level classifier to combine both approaches. However, it is 
acknowledged [2], [20], [30] that the models learned by 
unsupervised algorithms may misclassify known attacks, raising the 
overall number of misclassifications and skewing the whole meta-
learning towards a traditional unsupervised approach. 
4.1.2 Unsupervised Base-Learners 
Instead, feeding unsupervised model-based features to a supervised 
meta-level classifier may balance both approaches. The rationale is 
the following. Supervised classifiers learn a model that links 
specific feature values or compound conditions to anomalous 
labels. This makes them weak to unknowns as they may alter 
dataset features unpredictably. However, if meta-features are 
generated by unsupervised base-level learners, the output of the 
supervised meta-level is directly coupled to those model-based 
features other than dataset features, with potentially higher 
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detection accuracy in case of zero-day attacks. 
4.1.3 Supervised and Unsupervised Base-Learners 
The last option relies in adopting a mixed approach by using both 
approaches at the base-level. This has the clear advantage of 
decoupling the choice of the meta-level learner from the choice of 
base-level learners: regardless of the choice of the meta-level 
classifier, both approaches are still used in the base-level and 
therefore the resulting meta-learner embeds both supervised and 
unsupervised algorithms. However, this setup will provide relevant 
prominence either to supervised (if the meta-level classifier is 
supervised), or to unsupervised learning, unavoidably skewing the 
balance of the two approaches. 
4.2 Identification of Model-Based Meta Features 
4.2.1 Numeric and Binary Algorithms Scores  
We investigate potential model-based meta-features to be chosen 
for our Stacker. As already discussed in Figure 1, we assume each 
unsupervised algorithm ua to compute both the numeric score 
ua.num  and the binary score ua.bin obtained after applying a 
decision function to ua.num score (steps Te2, Te4 of Figure 1).  
Both scores are important: ua.bin is the final class predicted by 
the classifier after applying a given decision function, while ua.num 
score is a plain number that is solely assigned by the algorithm, 
without further processing. 
4.2.2 Output from Diverse Unsupervised Algorithms 
In addition, we believe it is beneficial to simultaneously employ 
more than a single unsupervised base-learner to generate model-
based meta-features for our Stacker. Let UA be a set of uk 
unsupervised algorithms UA = {ua1, ua2, …, uauk}. In total, the UA 
set generates 2·uk meta-features, or rather it generates uai.num and 
uai.bin features for each algorithm uai, 0 ≤ i ≤ uk.  
The UA set cannot be defined without information about i) the 
detection capabilities of individual algorithms and ii) their synergy. 
Noticeably, past studies show that the usage of diverse components 
[55] helps avoiding common mode failures [56] and this suggests 
the adoption of diverse algorithms to reduce misclassifications. 
However, defining two unsupervised algorithms as diverse is not 
straightforward. Potentially, all algorithms slightly differ in the way 
they classify data points: nevertheless, different algorithms may 
rely on the same heuristics. For example, algorithms as ODIN [61], 
FastABOD [46], LOF [70] and COF [67] embed a k-NN search 
either to devise their final score or to reduce computational costs. In 
this case, algorithms differ from each other but are not completely 
diverse as they all share the concept of neighbours. To such extent, 
in this study we consider two unsupervised algorithms diverse if 
they do not belong to the same family (i.e., clustering, density, 
neural network, angle, statistical, classification, neighbour, see 
Section 1.2). 
4.2.3 Voting Counters as Meta-Features 
Lastly, we present how voting can be used as an additional meta-
feature for our Stacker. A (weighted) voter first calculates a 
(weighted) counter and then applies a threshold that is learned 
during training to perform binary classification. To build meta-
features, computing the counter may suffice as the threshold may be 
learned during training of the supervised meta-level classifier.  
Considering the UA set of algorithms that generate num and bin 
meta-features, we define the two counters in (1) and (2). 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑈𝐴) = ∑ 𝑢𝑎𝑖 . 𝑏𝑖𝑛
𝑢𝑎𝑖∈𝑈𝐴







[1 − (−1)𝑢𝑎.𝑏𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑝(𝑢𝑎)]
𝑢𝑎∈𝑈𝐴
,  
−1 ≤ 𝑟𝑒𝑝(𝑢𝑎) ≤ 1       (2) 
The counter Count(UA) simply represents the amount of algorithms 
ua ϵ UA that have the feature ua.bin set to 1, or rather the amount of 
unsupervised algorithms that consider a given data point as 
anomalous. Consequently, 0≤ Count(UA)≤ |UA|. Instead, the 
counter WCount(UA, rep) calculates a weighted count, which 
extends Count(UA) by adding the concepts of reputation. Each 
algorithm ua ϵ UA is associated to a quantity rep(ua) ϵ [-1; 1], 
where -1 represents an algorithm that is always wrong, 1 identifies 
an algorithm that always correctly classifies data points, and 0 
describes an algorithm which is equivalent to random guessing. 
This allows calculating the weighted counter WCount(UA, rep) that 
ranges from 0, i.e., very confident that the data point describes a 
normal behaviour, to 1, which is achieved only when all ua ϵ UA 
have maximum reputation and agree on the anomaly.  
Figure 2 wraps up the discussion on meta-features by showing a 
practical example that considers sample values of UA = {AlgA, 
AlgB}, rep(AlgA) = 0.2 and rep(AlgB) = 0.8.  
4.3 Selection of the Meta-Level Classifier 
The adoption of unsupervised base-learners generates model-based 
meta-features that can be used by the supervised meta-level 
classifier to detect attacks. Such classifier should be chosen 
amongst algorithms that have been proven effective. Supervised 
binary classifiers are widely used since decades and therefore there 
are plenty of available solutions. We do not put any constraint on 
the meta-level classifier and therefore in this work we investigate 
different families of supervised classifiers, namely neighbour-based 
[39], boosting [32], decision trees and ensembles [31], support 
vector machines [33], statistical methods [40] and embedded deep 
neural networks [59].  




packets bytes Duration AlgA.num AlgB.num AlgA.bin AlgB.bin Count WCount label
13 13005 0 0.02 20552 1 1 2 0.775 anomaly
11 1292 0 0.17 1811 1 1 2 0.775 anomaly
271 13193 13 0.02 20857 1 1 2 0.775 anomaly
1 142 0 0.50 29 1 0 1 0.375 normal
1 160 0 4.78 0 0 0 0 0.225 normal
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5 Experimental Setup 
5.1 Methodology 
To elaborate and evaluate our Stacker, we performed an 
experimental campaign organized in five steps S1-S5 (Figure 3). 
S1. We collect public attack datasets that contain network data of 
real or simulated systems, creating variants that allow 
analysing unknown attacks (Section 5.2).  
S2. Then, we review the literature to select i) unsupervised 
algorithms that are suitable for anomaly detection in Section 
5.3, and ii) evaluation metrics  in Section 5.4.  
S3. Next, we apply each unsupervised algorithm on each dataset to 
devise model-based meta-features and collect metric scores, 
which will allow identifying meta-feature sets. This is 
described in Section 5.5. 
S4. Afterwards, in Section 5.6 we identify from literature the 
supervised binary classifiers that we will exercise as meta-
level learners on the meta-features computed in the step S3. 
S5. Last, the experiment execution is described in Section 5.7.  
The execution of experiments of S5 will allow elaborating in 
Section 6 on results, which will offer a wide variety of insights, 
showing evidence of the superiority of the stacking approach and 
identifying the recommended set-up for a supervised-unsupervised 
Stacker.  
5.2 The Selected Public Datasets 
This section reports the seven public datasets that we used in our 
study. Table 1 summarizes the datasets reporting name, reference, 
amount of data points, number of different attacks, and percentage 
of attack records in each dataset.  
Selected Datasets. Starting from the recent surveys [41], [90] and 
by querying online portals we selected datasets with the following 
characteristics: i) published in the last decade, ii) labeled (at least 
partially), iii) containing at least 100.000 data points to guarantee 
they contain a  sufficient amount of data, and iv) previously used 
for anomaly-based intrusion detection, to compare our scores with 
others. Our selection process resulted in the following datasets: 
ISCX12 (portions of Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Thursday logs to 
include 4 categories of attacks [42]), UNSW-NB15 (full train set, 
[45]), UGR16 (week4 portion, [50]), ADFA-NetflowIDS (full 
dataset, [51]), CICIDS17 (portions of Tuesday, Wednesday and 
Friday-Afternoon logs to include 4 categories of attacks, [53]) and 
CIDDS-001 (files ‘9’ and ‘20’, [44]). Moreover, we also included 
NSL-KDD (full train and test portions, [43]) as this dataset is often 
used as benchmark, despite it is more than 10-years-old.  
Datasets with Unknowns. To enable an analysis of detection 
capabilities of unknown attacks, we create variants of each dataset 
dn_att where i) dn, dataset name, is the name of the dataset, and ii) 
att, is one of the categories of attacks contained in the dn dataset. 
Each dataset variant dn_att is organized into a 50% train/test split 
where the train partition does not contain data points related to the 
attack att. Consequently, data points connected to att are unknown 
during training and are equivalent to zero-day attacks during 
testing. For example, ISCX12_BruteForce indicates a variant of the 
ISCX12 dataset where i) the train partition contains normal data and 
data related to all attacks except BruteForce i.e., DoS, DDoS and 
Infiltration attacks, and ii) the test partition contains normal data 
and data related to all the attacks DoS, DDoS, Infiltration and 
BruteForce. We create a total of 33 variants, one for each attack in 
each dataset: 5 for ADFA-Netflow, 4 for CIDDS-001, 4 for 
ISCX12, 4 for NSL-KDD, 5 for UGR16, 4 for CICIDS17 and 7 for 
UNSW-NB15. Overall, our experiments will use 7 full datasets and 
33 variants, for a total of 40 sets.  
5.3 Unsupervised Classifiers (Base-Level)  
We choose a set of unsupervised binary classifiers to perform 
intrusion detection on the selected datasets. To guarantee diversity 
of base-learners, we select a pool of algorithms that are as 
heterogeneous as possible and belong to angle, clustering, neural 
networks, density-based, neighbour-based, statistical, and 
classification families. We disregard heavy algorithms (e.g., ABOD 







Table 1: Datasets used in this study. We report on the name, the 
size of the subset we selected, number of ordinal features, 











ADFA-Netflow 132 002 3 5 31.03 2017 
CIDDS-001 400 000 7 4 39.16 2017 
ISCX12 400 000 6 4 7.96 2012 
NSL-KDD 148 516 37 4 48.12 2009 
UGR16 207 256 7 5 12.99 2016 
CICIDS17 500 000 75 4 29.88 2017 
UNSW-NB15 175 341 38 7 38.06 2015 
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[46], which has cubic time complexity), as this study already builds 
on meta-learning, which naturally requires many computing and 
memory resources. We select 14 algorithms as follows: 
● One algorithm for each family: One-Class SVM (classification 
family, [62]), K-Means (clustering, [73]), kNN (neighbour, 
unsupervised variant in [71]), HBOS (statistical, [60]), SOM 
(neural-network, [64]), FastABOD (Angle-Based, [46]), and 
LOF (density-based, [70]). 
● Other well-known algorithms as DBSCAN [69], COF [67], 
LDCOF [66], Isolation Forests [72], G-Means [65], ODIN 
[61], Sparse Density Observers (SDO, [63]) to widen the 
selection of unsupervised algorithms. 
Table 2 summarizes the 14 algorithms, which have at most 
quadratic complexity for training and constant test time, except for 
neighbour-based algorithms which perform kNN search and require 
at least logarithmic time using K-D trees. In addition, we looked for 
public frameworks that allow running unsupervised algorithms on 
datasets. After examining different options, we chose RELOAD 
[52], a Java open-source tool that wraps unsupervised algorithms 
from ELKI and WEKA, and includes additional implementations of 
unsupervised algorithms. The tool also allow to setup grid searches 
to devise optimal values of algorithms parameters. Besides G-
Means, which does not rely on parameters, we try the following 
combinations of parameters. 
 Values k for kNN-based algorithms, samples s and trees t 
building iForest, number hist of histograms in HBOS and 
observers obs of SDO are chosen in the set {1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20, 
50, 100, 200, 500}.  
Other algorithms have specific parameters as follows:  
 One-class SVM may be created either with {linear, quadratic, 
cubic, radial basis function} kernels and nu, which affects the 
amount of support vectors to be created, in {0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 
0.1, 0.2}.  
 In addition to obs, SDO needs also a q ϵ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5} 
threshold that the algorithm uses to derive the “closest” 
observers. 
 Lastly, DBSCAN clustering uses a combination of the 
minimum number of data points in a cluster minPts ϵ {1, 2, 3, 
5, 10} and eps ϵ {100, 200, 500, 1000}, which defines the 
radius of the cluster around each data point. 
For each algorithm and each dataset, grid searches discover the 
parameter values that allow obtaining the best MCC score in a 
small portion of dataset (not overlapping with the testing set), 
which is used for validation. These grid searches are automatically 
managed by RELOAD. 
5.4 Metrics for Evaluation 
The effectiveness of binary classifiers is usually assessed by 
calculating correct classifications (true positives TP, true negatives 
TN) and misclassifications (false negatives FN, false positives FP), 
which build the so-called confusion matrix. From [49], commonly 
used metrics aggregate items of the confusion matrix to build 
Precision, Recall (or Coverage), False Positive Rate (FPR), 
Accuracy (ACC), FScore-β (Fβ), F-Measure (F1), Area Under ROC 
Curve (AUC) and Matthews Coefficient (MCC).  
Each metric has its own strengths and weaknesses which must 
be discussed considering the specific domain. In particular, 
intrusion detectors should primarily focus in reducing FNs, that is, 
when attacks are not detected. However, it is also evident that a 
very suspicious IDS - which heavily reduces the amount of FNs at 
the price of increasing FPs – may offer satisfying detection 
capabilities but at the cost of many false alarms. Consequently, in 
this paper we mainly evaluate detection capabilities of ML 
algorithms with the following metrics.   
 Misclassifications (Misc), that is the percentage of 
misclassifications with respect to the whole dataset, defined as 
Misc = 1 – Accuracy. 
 Matthews Coefficient (MCC) [48], which aggregates all classes 
of the confusion matrix and provides results that suit also 
unbalanced datasets [47] i.e., containing mostly normal data 
points and only few attacks. 
 Recall [49], an FN-oriented metric that shows the percentage 
of detected attacks out of all attacks. Whenever applicable, we 
also calculate Recall-Unk, or rather the recall which is only 
related to detection of attacks that are not included in the 
training set (if any). 
5.5 Meta-Feature Sets 
Let UA = {COF, DBSCAN, FastABOD, G-Means, HBOS, iForest, 
K-Means, kNN, LDCOF, LOF, ODIN, SDO, SOM, One-Class 
SVM} be the set of 14 unsupervised algorithms we presented in 
Section 5.3, and let rep be a 14-items array that contains the MCC ϵ 
[-1; 1] score that each algorithm obtains on a given dataset. To 
explore how different feature sets impact misclassifications of the 
meta-level classifier (and of the stacker as a whole) we derive the 
feature sets DataF, MetaF(A) and FullF(A) as follows. 
Table 2: Unsupervised algorithms that we use as base-learners to generate model-based meta-features. Parameters and 
complexities refer to the implementations available in the RELOAD [52] tool. 
Algorithm Family Parameters 
Complexity (n: train set size) 
Train Test 
COF Density, Neighbour k: number of neighbours O(knlog(n)) O(klog(n)) 
DBSCAN Clustering minPts, eps O(nlog(n)) O(1) 
FastABOD Angle, Neighbour k: number of neighbours O(n2+nk2) O(k2log(n)) 
G-Means Clustering (automatic search of cluster number c) O(cn) O(c) 
HBOS Statistical b: number of bins O(n) O(1) 
iForest Classification t: number of trees, s: tree samples O(tslog(s)) O(tlog(s)) 
K-Means Clustering c: number of clusters O(cn) O(c) 
kNN Neighbour k: number of neighbours O(nlog(n)) O(klog(n)) 
LDCOF Density, Clustering c: number of clusters O(c2+ cn) O(c2) 
LOF Density, Neighbour k: number of neighbours O(kn+nlog(n)) O(klog(n)) 
ODIN Neighbour k: number of neighbours O(nlog(n)) O(klog(n)) 
SDO Density obs: number of observers, q O(obsn) O(obs) 
SOM Neural Network e:epochs, x: neurons O(nex) O(x) 
1-Class SVM Classification kernel, nu: fraction of margin errors O(n2) O(1) 
 
             JOURNAL OF NETWORK AND COMPUTER APPLICATIONS                                                                 8 
 
𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝐹 = {∀𝑓 ∈ 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡  | 𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠} 
𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑎𝐹(𝐴) = {𝑢𝑎. 𝑛𝑢𝑚, 𝑢𝑎. 𝑏𝑖𝑛 ∀𝑢𝑎 ∈ 𝐴} ∪ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝐴)
∪ 𝑊𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝐴, 𝑟𝑒𝑝(𝐴)) 
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝐹(𝐴) = 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐹(𝐴) ∪ 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑎𝐹(𝐴) 
In a nutshell, DataF is the set of all features of a target dataset. 
MetaF(A) contain the ua.num and ua.bin for all the algorithms, plus 
the voting counters Count(A) and WCount(A,rep(A)). FullF(A) 
merges DataF and MetaF(A) features. 
5.6 Supervised Classifiers (Meta-Level) 
Supervised classifiers will implement the meta-level learner of the 
Stacker. Different algorithms may suit the implementation of this 
layer: we select the well-known K-Nearest Neighbors (kNN, [39]), 
Support Vector Machines (SVMs, [33]), Decision Trees , Random 
Forests [31], ADABoost [32], Naive Bayes and Quadratic 
Discriminant Analysis [40], whose implementations are all made 
available in the Scikit-Learn 1  Python package. Algorithms 
parameters, whose best configuration is selected through grid 
searches similarly to RELOAD, range as described below. 
 K-NN with values of k ϵ {1, 3, 10, 30, 100} and Euclidean 
distance as reference distance function. 
 SVM: we individually instantiate three different SVMs using 
Linear, RBF or Polynomial (Quadratic) kernels. 
 Decision Tree: we adopted different depth limits in the range 
{5, 20, no limit} to define how the tree is built. 
 Boosting: AdaBoostM2 algorithm with {10, 30, 100, 200} 
trees.  
 Random Forest: we devised 6 parameter combinations by 
using {10, 30, 100} trees, either with unlimited depth of 
decision trees, or with maximum depth limited to 10.  
 Naïve Bayes and Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA): 
usage of default parameters provided by Scikit-Learn. 
Further, we consider neural networks enhanced with entity 
embedding, which improves fitting on tabular data when the data is 
sparse and/or statistics are unknown. With entity embedding, 
similar values are mapped in the embedding space to reveal the 
intrinsic properties of the categorical (discrete) variables [58]. The 
Python code for entity embedding was crafted starting from [59] 
and made available at [93] . 
5.7 Experiments Setup and Execution 
We describe here the experimental setup for our study.  
Feature Selection (Base-Learners). We apply Information Gain 
[91] to automatically rank and extract the most relevant features out 
of each dataset, filtering out noisy features.  
Feature Selection (Meta-Level Learner). We let supervised 
algorithms to automatically select and derive features (as it is the 
case of representation learning for deep learners [58]) by providing 
them an entire meta-feature set.  
Train-Test Split. We generate model-based unsupervised features 
for the full dataset (and variants) by adopting a 30-70 train-test split 





not make the Java-based RELOAD escalate into memory errors. 
For supervised algorithms to be used as meta-level learners, we 
proceed to a 50-50 train-test split. 
Machine to Execute Experiments. Once all the parameters 
mentioned above are set, we run the experimental campaigns 
including all the datasets and algorithms considered in this study. 
The experiments have been executed on a server equipped Dell 
Precision 5820 Tower with a 12-Core I9-9920X and GPU Nvidia 
Quadro RTX5000, and 2.5 TB of user storage.  
Experiments Execution. Overall, executing the experiments 
required approximately 50 days of 24H execution. All the metric 
scores and files that we used to collect and summarize values are 
publicly available at [94]. 
6 Comparing the Stacker with Supervised and 
Unsupervised Classifiers  
This section discusses results of our experimental campaign to 
show the improvements in adopting the Stacker with respect to 
either supervised or unsupervised ML algorithms to detect 
intrusions.  
6.1 Information carried by Unsupervised Meta-Features  
First, we aim at understanding if and how unsupervised meta-
features can provide additional information that has the potential to 
reduce misclassifications of the Stacker with respect to traditional 
classifiers. In Table 3 we report the highest information gain 
(column “1” in Table 3; the highest value assigned to one of the 
available features), and the average information gain computed 
using the top 3, 5, 10 features with the highest information gain 
(columns “3”, “5”, “10” respectively). Those aggregated scores of 
information gain are computed for the DataF, MetaF(UA), and 
Table 3: Information Gain scores of the best 1, 3, 5, 10 features of 
different feature sets for each of the 7 datasets. 
Dataset Feature Set 
# 
Feat. 
Information Gain (Avg) 
1 3 5 10 
ADFANet 
DataF 3 .859 .381 .381 .381 
MetaF(UA) 30 .865 .865 .864 .860 
FullF(UA) 33 .865 .865 .864 .861 
CICIDS17 
DataF 75 .491 .478 .447 .407 
MetaF (UA) 30 .445 .440 .438 .434 
FullF(UA) 105 .491 .478 .463 .449 
CIDDS-
001 
DataF 7 .886 .708 .527 .387 
MetaF (UA) 30 .855 .818 .788 .737 
FullF(UA) 37 .886 .855 .828 .773 
ISCX12 
DataF 6 .339 .317 .272 .248 
MetaF (UA) 30 .319 .303 .248 .192 
FullF(UA) 36 .339 .331 .317 .260 
NSL-KDD 
DataF 37 .746 .657 .588 .500 
MetaF (UA) 30 .700 .671 .652 .635 
FullF(UA) 67 .746 .703 .677 .648 
UGR16 
DataF 7 .442 .285 .201 .147 
MetaF (UA) 30 .402 .399 .394 .382 
FullF(UA) 37 .442 .413 .406 .390 
UNSW-
NB15 
DataF 38 .592 .520 .428 .319 
MetaF (UA) 30 .651 .613 .595 .553 
FullF(UA) 68 .651 .615 .602 .563 
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FullF(UA) of each dataset in Table 1.  
For example, we focus on the UNSW-NB15 dataset at the 
bottom of the table. We observe that average values of information 
gain when considering FullF(UA) features are higher than DataF, 
which does not contain model-based meta-features. This trend holds 
when we consider the quantity of information carried by the best 
feature, that is the column labelled as “1” in Table 3. The value 
assigned to FullF(UA) is higher than DataF and overlaps with 
MetaF(UA): this means that the most informative feature is a meta-
feature (namely, feature WCount(UA)). Consequently, we can 
expect that meta-level classifiers will build upon such feature when 
building their models and therefore it will contribute to improve 
classification. A similar behaviour can be observed for ADFANet 
dataset (on top of Table 3), which indeed has different 
characteristics with respect to UNSW as it contains only 3 ordinal 
dataset features. This has multiple implications: i) the average of 
the best 3, 5, 10 features of DataF will be the same, and ii) the 
addition of meta-features will likely provide useful additional 
information since the number of feature dramatically raises from 3 
to 33 (see # Feat. column in Table 3).  
Overall, the information carried by FullF(UA) features is 
(significantly) higher than DataF in all datasets when looking at 5 
and 10 features, and often improves the score of the best feature or 
the top three features. This analysis quantitatively shows that meta-
features carry relevant information and therefore have potential to 
enhance classification.  
Table 4: Misclassifications, MCC, Recall, Recall_Unk (recall on unknowns-only) achieved by algorithms on each of the 7 dataset and their 
variants. For each metric, we report scores obtained by using Supervised algorithms with DataF features, Stacker with MetaF(UA) and 















 Misclassifications (%) MCC Recall Recall-Unk 




























- 0.0 1.33 0.32 0.44 2.41 .969 .992 .990 .945 .996 .998 .999 .984 - - - 
Mailbomb 0.8 1.96 0.32 0.44 1.33 .956 .992 .990 .970 .996 .998 .999 .997 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Other 2.7 1.96 1.17 1.17 1.33 .956 .973 .973 .970 .980 .980 .972 .997 .750 .776 .776 
Portsweep 3.8 1.96 0.32 0.44 0.70 .956 .992 .990 .984 .996 .998 .998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1b 10.3 0.47 0.95 0.60 0.67 .989 .978 .986 .984 .991 .986 .964 1.000 .980 .974 .960 







 - 0.0 0.03 0.10 0.03 1.85 .999 .959 .999 .915 .959 .998 .998 .861 - - - 
Patator 1.0 0.76 1.60 1.02 1.90 .966 .927 .954 .912 .878 .921 .941 .857 .295 .295 .295 
PortScan 11.2 11.14 6.81 11.12 3.66 .346 .722 .349 .923 .862 .138 .138 .958 .007 .992 .806 








 - 0.0 0.97 1.27 0.19 12.15 .980 .974 .996 .746 .998 .998 .997 .753 - - - 
BruteForce 0.1 0.82 1.27 1.27 12.31 .983 .974 .974 .746 .997 .997 .997 .876 .000 .126 .077 
PingScan 0.2 0.84 1.28 0.21 13.74 .982 .974 .996 .713 .997 .997 .997 .837 .978 .988 .963 
PortScan 9.4 9.15 9.41 3.35 11.89 .815 .810 .931 .758 .762 .919 .763 .718 .060 .661 .673 






 - 0.0 3.55 3.21 1.20 5.94 .796 .761 .916 .489 .670 .903 .899 .290 - - - 
DoS 0.6 3.03 3.22 1.67 6.64 .803 .758 .882 .464 .641 .830 .861 .386 .004 .392 .214 
BruteForce 0.9 3.85 3.12 1.45 6.54 .766 .768 .897 .484 .686 .838 .702 .421 .001 .222 .270 
DDoS 3.1 3.86 5.76 3.77 6.00 .702 .524 .711 .480 .378 .556 .538 .263 .000 .231 .322 







 - 0.0 0.55 1.10 0.61 9.07 .989 .978 .988 .817 .993 .997 .996 .877 - - - 
u2r 0.1 0.58 1.13 0.63 9.89 .988 .977 .987 .801 .993 .996 .997 .876 .267 .400 .550 
r2l 2.8 2.57 2.87 2.46 9.36 .949 .942 .951 .812 .954 .959 .963 .868 .056 .129 .155 
Probe 9.5 4.44 4.49 4.88 10.94 .911 .910 .902 .780 .923 .923 .919 .853 .282 .604 .651 







- 0.0 0.44 2.19 0.33 3.98 .980 .907 .985 .759 .953 .975 .977 .808 - - - 
BlackList 0.4 0.71 2.47 0.73 7.01 .969 .893 .968 .708 .925 .944 .931 .797 .000 .040 .000 
NerisBotnet 0.4 0.65 2.88 0.66 6.21 .971 .872 .971 .734 .880 .886 .952 .798 .015 .000 .000 
Anom-Spam 0.7 1.08 2.54 1.14 5.15 .952 .889 .949 .771 .915 .912 .914 .796 .000 .000 .000 
DoS 2.3 1.64 3.24 0.25 6.38 .926 .856 .989 .733 .867 .982 .974 .815 .514 1.000 1.000 










- 0.0 6.76 5.95 2.81 17.31 .862 .879 .941 .653 .971 .982 .981 .870 - - - 
Worms 0.1 6.73 6.01 3.04 17.57 .862 .878 .937 .626 .971 .984 .981 .763 .985 1.000 1.000 
Shellcode 0.7 6.81 5.89 2.82 17.77 .862 .880 .941 .622 .970 .981 .980 .757 .984 .956 .984 
Backdoor 1.1 6.15 5.84 2.95 17.43 .873 .881 .939 .630 .970 .984 .981 .766 1.000 .993 .999 
Analysis 1.2 6.10 5.93 2.90 17.76 .874 .879 .939 .622 .968 .981 .973 .758 .833 .985 .907 
Reconnaiss. 6.3 6.58 6.14 2.93 17.77 .866 .874 .939 .622 .964 .982 .980 .757 .977 .968 .996 
DoS 7.4 7.46 6.02 3.67 17.71 .848 .877 .924 .623 .967 .982 .980 .757 .967 .988 .995 
Exploits 10.3 5.76 5.55 2.81 17.42 .879 .886 .941 .630 .968 .978 .976 .766 .968 .992 .990 
Fuzzers 11.0 10.37 7.57 9.08 16.27 .784 .839 .811 .659 .855 .782 .781 .811 .198 .561 .272 
 Averages  4.26 4.09 2.80 8.62 .870 .870 .911 .746 .862 .913 .900 .785 .482 .631 .611 
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6.2 Discussion and Comparisons on Detection of Attacks  
Then, we compare and discuss classification capabilities of the 
Stacker and classic supervised and unsupervised algorithms with 
the aid of Table 4, which provides a view on Misclassifications, 
MCC, Recall and Recall-Unk metrics.  
For each metric, the table reports different columns, namely: i) 
Sup - DataF, that describes scores achieved by supervised 
algorithms in Section 5.6 on each dataset by using DataF features, 
ii) Stacker - MetaF(UA), the Stacker results by using MetaF(UA) 
features, iii) Stacker - FullF(UA), the Stacker results by using 
FullF(UA) features, and iv) Unsup - DataF, scores of unsupervised 
algorithms in Section 5.3 using DataF features. The table reports 
metric scores of Sup - DataF, Stacker – MetaF(UA), Stacker 
FullF(UA) and Unsup - DataF classifiers that achieved the highest 
MCC in each dataset or its variants. Recall-Unk is not computed for 
Unsup – DataF classifiers, because unsupervised algorithms do not 
distinguish between known and unknown attacks and therefore it is 
not meaningful to distinguish Recall from Recall-Unk metric. 
Low misclassification (Misc) scores point to datasets or variants 
containing data points that are mostly classified correctly by 
algorithms: the full dataset and variants of ADFANet, ISCX12, and 
UGR16 result in less than 5% of misclassifications, as shown in the 
Misclassification columns of Table 4. On the other hand, the variant 
CIDDS_DoS scores a very high percentage of misclassifications, 
which is around 30% when using Supervised (Sup-DataF) 
algorithms and the Stacker, either using MetaF(UA) or FullF(UA) 
features. Additionally, misclassifications in CICIDS17_PortScan 
and UNSW_Fuzzers hover around 10%: on average, a data point 
out of 10 is going to be misclassified.  
Misclassifications of Unsupervised (Unsup-DataF) algorithms 
do not fluctuate much for the different variants of the same dataset, 
but they are generally higher than Supervised (Sup-DataF) 
algorithms and Stacker counterparts. In fact, training goes 
unlabelled and therefore the addition of data points connected to 
specific attacks has less impact in defining the normal behaviour 
than when training supervised classifiers.  
These trends become even clearer when considering averages, 
in the last row of Table 4: supervised algorithms average 4.26% of 
misclassifications in datasets and their variants, while unsupervised 
algorithms reach an average of 8.62%. Noticeably, the Stacker-
FullF(UA) averages 2.80% of misclassifications, with a 33% of 
reduction with respect to supervised classifiers. The trend is 
confirmed also by MCC scores in the centre of Table 4: 
unsupervised algorithms achieve the lowest average of 0.746, while 
Stacker-FullF(UA) outperforms all other classifiers reaching an 
MCC of 0.911. Note that the higher the MCC, the better.  
Advantages in adopting the Stacker-FullF(UA) over Sup-DataF 
is depicted in Figure 4, which shows the difference of MCC score 
when applying those two classifiers. The adoption of the Stacker is 
beneficial as it mostly raises MCC i.e., almost all points in Figure 4 
are above 0. Moreover, in some cases the growth is noticeable, 
either because there is a huge difference (e.g., for ISCX_Infiltration 
the MCC of Stacker with FullF(UA) grows up to 0.759, while 
supervised achieved only 0.536), or because even a smaller 
difference is extremely meaningful. In particular, in the full CIDDS 
dataset Supervised classifiers Sup-DataF achieve a 0.98 of MCC 
with 1% of misclassifications, while Stacker-FullF(UA) obtains a 
slightly higher MCC of 0.996, but with only 0.2% 
misclassifications. Summarizing, Stacker - FullF(UA) shows the 
highest MCC in 22 datasets or variants out of the 40 in Table 4, and 
outperforms Sup-DataF in 30 datasets or variants (75% of the cases 
considered in this study). 
6.3 Stacker and Zero-Day Attacks 
We focus now on undetected attacks, measured as False Negatives 
and by means of aggregated metrics such as Recall. Recall scores in 
Table 4 follow a trend similar to MCC: Unsup-DataF show lower 
scores than Sup-DataF classifiers; Stacker overall improves Recall, 
again showing the best average scores. With respect to the detection 
of zero-day attacks, Recall-Unk scores allow elaborating the 
following aspects:  
 Values of Recall and Recall-Unk for Supervised classifiers i.e., 
Sup-DataF columns in Table 4, are clearly different, 
confirming that those algorithms lack in detecting zero-day 
attacks. 
 Recall values of unsupervised algorithms i.e., Unsup-DataF in 
Table 4, are remarkably lower than Recall values achieved by 
supervised classifiers and by the Stacker, but are clearly higher 
than their Recall-Unk values. This confirms that unsupervised 
algorithms generate several misclassifications, but also less 
FNs when dealing with zero-day attacks.   
 Similarly to what happened with Misc and MCC metrics, 
adopting the Stacker - especially using FullF(UA) features - 
improves both Recall and Recall-Unk with respect to Sup-
DataF supervised classifiers. Figure 5 depicts a scatterplot of 
the difference of Recall-Unk score against the percentage of 
unknowns in datasets or variants: this shows how difference is 
almost always positive, motivating even more the adoption of 
the Stacker approach. Noticeably, the figure has a trend similar 
to Figure 4, but absolute difference is in most cases higher (up 
to 0.8) with respect to the plot regarding MCC.  
6.4 Supervised Classifiers as Meta-Level Learners 
It turns out evident that the adoption of Stacker with FullF(UA) 
features maximises classification performance for intrusion 
Figure 4: Difference of MCC achieved by Stacker-FullF(UA) and 







































Figure 5: Difference of Recall-Unk achieved by Stacker-FullF(UA) 











































             JOURNAL OF NETWORK AND COMPUTER APPLICATIONS                                                                 11 
 
detection. However, we still need to investigate on which 
supervised classifier should be used as meta-level learner when 
instantiating such Stacker. Therefore, Table 5 reports Average and 
Std of MCC scores of all supervised classifiers to be potentially 
used as meta-level learners for the Stacker, with different 
parameters’ values. In addition, the table reports on # Best, the 
number of datasets or variants in which a supervised algorithm 
achieves the highest MCC. 
Embedded deep neural networks and Random Forests (100 
trees, no depth limit) are generally the preferred choice. In 
particular, Random Forests outperform other supervised algorithms 
in 16 out of 40 datasets or variants, and it also has the highest 
average MCC. Multiple instantiations of kNN (1-NN, 3-NN, 30-
NN) have average MCC higher than 0.90, but the variability of their 
scores is higher than Random Forests’. The smallest variability of 
MCC scores (i.e., lowest Std MCC in the table) belongs indeed to 
Embedded Networks, which therefore can be considered an overall 
balanced choice. Statistical methods as Naïve Bayes and QDA 
show very high variability and therefore are not reliable enough to 
be used as meta-level learner, while ADABoost and MLP produce 
many misclassifications. 
Wrapping up, we propose either Random Forests (100 trees) or 
Embedded Networks as meta-level learners for the Stacker, as they 
both show good scores.  
7 A Stacker for Intrusion Detection 
With the help of Figure 6, we instantiate a Stacker that uses 
FullF(UA) meta-features as derived in this study.  
7.1 The Overall Architecture 
The process of detecting intrusions starts from the target system 
(i.e., step  in the top left of Figure 6). Here, probes monitor 
network data, which is logged to build the set of DataF features . 
Those features partially build the FullF(UA) feature set alongside 
with MetaF(UA) features, which have to be calculated by feeding 
UA base-learners with DataF features. The process of exercising 
base-learners can be break down into three partitions. 
 K-Means based base-level classifiers ( in Figure 6). K-
Means assigns num and bin scores to a data point after 
identifying the nearest cluster; this information partially builds 
LDCOF score, which can therefore be calculated as extension 
of K-Means scores. 
 kNN-based Base-Level Classifiers . ODIN, FastABOD, 
kNN, LOF and COF all need to derive the k-nearest 
neighbours to a given data point and then incrementally 
Figure 6: Instantiation of the proposed Stacker. The figure identifies 7 steps  to , described in Section 7. 
 
Table 5: Supervised Classifiers to be used as Meta-Level learners, 
coupled with their parameters values. For each couple, we report 
the average and standard MCC they achieve on datasets and 
variants, as well as the times in which an algorithm achieved the 








# Best  
ADABoost 
10 trees 0.883 0.081 1 
30 trees 0.886 0.081 1 
100 trees 0.795 0.276 0 
200 trees 0.764 0.325 1 
kNN 
1-NN 0.906 0.077 1 
3-NN 0.902 0.081 0 
10-NN 0.899 0.079 5 
30-NN 0.903 0.084 0 
100-NN 0.897 0.093 3 
Decision Tree 
no max depth 0.750 0.211 0 
depth: 20 0.751 0.207 2 
depth: 5 0.801 0.171 0 
MLP Default 0.815 0.189 0 
Embedded 
Networks 
3 dense layers, batch 
norm., dropout 0.5 
0.899 0.037 10 
NaïveBayes default 0.674 0.312 0 
QDA default 0.538 0.472 0 
SVM 
Linear kernel 0.844 0.092 0 
Quadratic kernel 0.866 0.097 0 
RBF kernel 0.853 0.095 0 
Random 
Forest 
10 trees, no depth limit 0.904 0.062 0 
10 trees, depth: 10 0.912 0.053 2 
30 trees, no depth limit 0.915 0.056 1 
30 trees, depth: 10 0.915 0.056 1 
100 trees, no depth limit 0.915 0.061 12 
100 trees, depth: 10 0.912 0.066 0 
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compute their score depending on this information. Therefore, 
the kNN search can be executed only once, delivering its result 
to those algorithms that can quickly compute the final num and 
bin features. 
 Other Unsupervised Base-Level Classifiers . Those base-
learners assign anomaly scores according to non-overlapping 
heuristics and therefore have to be exercised independently. 
 
Alongside with DataF features, model-based meta-features ua.num, 
ua.bin generated by unsupervised base-learners ua ϵ UA in steps , 
,  are then used to build the FullF(UA) feature set ( in the 
figure), which is delivered to the supervised meta-level classifier. 
Such classifier, either Random Forests or Embedded Networks, 
processes FullF(UA) features and finally decides on anomalies (i.e., 
step ), completing the precise instantiation of the Stacker(UA).  
7.2 On the Implementation of the Stacker  
Grouping base-learners into , ,  allows simplifying the overall 
architecture and avoiding repeating duplicate actions as kNN 
search. Even after grouping base-learners to avoid duplicate 
computations, the set of base-learners still requires the 
implementation of multiple unsupervised algorithms. Those 
algorithms are mostly well-known and therefore public 
implementations are available in different programming languages 
that suit their execution in different environments. Still, at the end 
of the paper we plan future works to instantiate the Stacker with a 
set of base-learners that contain less algorithms than UA.  
7.3 Computational Complexity 
Lastly, we elaborate on the computational complexity of the 
Stacker. The Stacker decides on intrusions by first exercising base-
learners and then the meta-level learner; while base-learners may be 
executed in parallel, the execution of the meta-level learner is 
necessarily sequential to them. Considering our UA set of 14 
unsupervised algorithms, Random Forests as a meta-level learner 
and a function cc that calculates the computational complexity of an 
algorithm, we obtain that: 
cc(Stacker(FullF(UA))) = max{cc(ua) | ua ϵ UA} +  
cc(Random Forests) ≈ cc(FastABOD) + cc(Random Forests) 
In fact, as it can be noticed in Table 2, FastABOD is the 
unsupervised algorithm that has the highest asymptotic 
computational complexity both for train and test phases. Instead, 
the computational complexity of Random Forests mimics those of 
iForest, as the time needed to train and test a decision tree and an 
isolation tree are asymptotically the same. Considering n as the size 
of the training set, we can further elaborate the complexity formula 
by splitting into train and test complexity as it is shown below. 
Train: cc(Stacker(UA)) ≈ O(n2+nk2) + O(tslog(s)) ϵ O(n2) 
Test: cc(Stacker(UA)) ≈ O(k2log(n))+ O(tlog(s)) ϵ O(log(n)) 
Aside from n, which represent the size of the train set, k, t, s are 
constant algorithm-dependent parameters. Value k is obtained 
through grid searches when training FastABOD, t is the number of 
trees building the Random Forest, which we set to 100 as resulting 
from Section 6, and s is the sample size used to build trees in the 
Random Forest. Even if we consider s = n, the asymptotic 
complexity of the Stacker is similar to those of many classifiers, 
which need quadratic time for training and logarithmic time for 
testing. 
8 Comparison with Literature Studies about Intrusion 
Detection  
Ultimately, we position our work with respect to existing studies in 
the literature that targeted intrusion detection with the datasets we 
used in this study. Such comparison will not elaborate on the 
variants of datasets we introduced in this paper, as they are newly 
created for this work and are not used in any existing study. Instead, 
we compare metric scores achieved by the Stacker on full datasets 
with studies we selected according to the following criteria:  
 Recent (i.e., published in the last 5 years), to guarantee that 
algorithms are implemented with recent strategies to enhance 
classification. 
 At least two studies for each of the 7 datasets we used in this 
study, to provide a minimum baseline for comparison. 
 Priority to papers published in international journals rather 
than conferences, whenever possible.  
Our review ended up selecting 15 papers: 2 for ADFANet [87], 
[88], 3 for CICIDS17 [80], [82], [83], 3 for CIDDS-001 [82], [84], 
[89], 2 for ISCX12 [79], [81], 3 for NSL-KDD [78], [81], [83], 3 
for UGR16 [76], [85], [86], and 4 for UNSW-NB15 [76], [77], [81], 
[83]. Those papers use metrics different than MCC to evaluate 
intrusion detectors; consequently, we calculated common metrics 
achieved by the Stacker on each dataset to enable comparisons. As 
a result, Table 6 reports on Accuracy (ACC), Precision (P), Recall 
(R), F-Measure (F1), Area Under ROC Curve (AUC) and False 
Table 6: Studies applying ML-based intrusion detection strategies  
on public datasets used in this study. Grayed lines point to metric 
scores achieved by the Stacker described in this paper, while bold-
font rows highlight the best metric scores achieved for datasets. 







[88] 0.9530 0.995 0.958 
   
Stacker 0.9956 0.998 0.988 0.993 0.993 0.012 
[80] 
CICIDS17 
0.9988         0.002 
[83] 0.9900 




   
0.787 0.781 
 








    
0.021 
[82] 
   
0.675 0.720 
 
Stacker 0.9981 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.002 
[79] 
ISCX12 
0.9992   0.989     0.038 
[81] 0.9988 
    
0.035 









    
0.033 
[83] 0.9750 0.976 0.984 
  
0.075 
Stacker 0.9939 0.997 0.990 0.993 0.993 0.010 
[85] 
UGR16 
0.9961 0.996         
[76] 0.9719 0.988 0.981 
   
[86] 
 
0.897 0.887 0.888 0.868 
 





     
[76] 0.9400 0.960 0.930 0.950 
  
[81] 0.9371 
    
0.046 
[83] 0.8800 
   
0.860 
 
Stacker 0.9719 0.982 0.946 0.964 0.964 0.054 
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Positive Rate (FPR) achieved by the studies above and by the 
Stacker on each dataset. The table is structured as follows: we 
grouped metric scores of studies targeting the same dataset: for each 
dataset, we report a greyed line which contains the metric scores 
achieved by the Stacker. Empty cells in the table happen when 
related papers do not report on a given metric. The metrics reported 
in the table were chosen amongst the most commonly used in the 
papers we selected, and provide a good baseline to compare 
intrusion detectors.  
At a first glance, we may notice how Table 6 reports on many 
ACC scores, which are provided by all studies but [82], [86] and 
therefore represent a first term of comparison. In all datasets but 
ISCX12 the Stacker achieves higher accuracy than literature 
studies, pointing to a lower amount of misclassifications, either FPs 
or FNs. This is remarkable as in our study we do not conduct 
dataset-specific analyses (e.g., hand-crafting custom features, pre-
processing) that may lead to optimize metric scores for a given 
dataset. Therefore, the supervised-unsupervised Stacker we built in 
this paper generally improves accuracy and therefore has a broad 
range of applicability. However, it is necessary to analyse the case 
of ISCX12 dataset, where metric scores of the Stacker are slightly 
lower than its competitors [79], [81]. First, we notice that both 
studies [79], [81] conduct a cluster analysis to better characterize 
different attacks, and that works as first step of their analysis and 
provides them a key advantage as it reveals very effective in 
increasing metric scores. Moreover, in [79] authors used larger train 
sets and crafted 30 additional dataset-specific features to help the 
process, while in [81] authors paired extra-tree classifiers with time 
windows. 
Overall, we can conclude that the Stacker presented in this 
paper proved to be very competitive with respect to recent studies, 
and improved classification scores of known attacks in 6 out of the 
7 datasets we considered. It is also shaped to be more robust to the 
detection of unknowns, which is a very challenging topic for both 
academia and industry.  
9 Concluding Remarks and Lessons Learned 
This paper motivated the need to combine supervised and 
unsupervised machine learning algorithms to make network 
intrusion detectors able to deal with known and unknown (zero-
day) threats. To such extent, we analysed available supervised and 
unsupervised machine learning algorithms, as well as meta-learning 
approaches which allows combining different classifiers. This 
process led building a Stacking ensemble, that is, a two-layer meta-
learner that orchestrates unsupervised base-level learners and a 
supervised meta-level classifier. With respect to traditional 
supervised intrusion detectors, our Stacker reduces 
misclassifications approximately by 33% and noticeably enhances 
the detection of zero-day attacks (i.e., Recall on unknown attacks 
clearly improves). Therefore, it has potential to be adopted as a 
unified solution for Intrusion Detection. We confirmed the efficacy 
of the Stacker with an extensive comparison against recent studies 
which performed intrusion detection on the same public datasets we 
used; in 6 out of 7 datasets, our Stacker outperformed existing 
studies. 
Our current and future works are primarily directed to 
investigate on the reduction of the number of unsupervised base-
learners to build such Stacker. The objective is to minimize the 
number of base-learners that are required to make the Stacker easier 
to implement, but without reducing metric scores. The key 
argument is that the extent base learners contribute to the decision 
process varies from learner to learner. We are planning an extensive 
sensitivity analyses to identify the minimal set(s) of base-learners 
which have the highest role in the decision process, and guarantee 
excellent detection capabilities. We are investigating correlation of 
scores assigned by unsupervised algorithms, to elaborate and 
quantify their synergy and diversity, rather than using a selection 
strategy based on qualitative categories as the families of 
algorithms.  
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